The bar itself has a certain well-worn charm that reminds one of friendly little pubs in Europe - all dark wood, fake leather and dim, smoky corners. Except that therersquo;s no smoke anymore. Sri Lankarsquo;s draconian anti-tobacco laws have banished smoking to a glass-walled cage at the far end of the room. I curse softly and park myself in a cubicle, ordering a gin-and-tonic, and wait for the man.

The place is more or less empty - itrsquo;s not yet 6pm - and ten minutes later, Irsquo;m on my second Gamp;T, when he walks in. Or at least I assume itrsquo;s him. Irsquo;ve no clue what he looks like, though he should recognize me since I mailed him the link to my blog the day before. Itrsquo;s all a bit James Bondish, and I feel quite silly until he spots me and veers over to the cubicle.

Major Rohan - Irsquo;ve agreed to use only his first name, and not take any pictures - shakes my hand and sits down. Hersquo;s a big guy in his late thirties, close to six feet, but athletically built, with shortish hair and skin thatrsquo;s negro black from long hours in the sun. Hersquo;s dressed in a short-sleeve button-down shirt and jeans, and looks exactly what he is - a businessman out for an informal drink.

He orders a Lion lager and we begin to chat. Hersquo;s amused that a web site would want to interview him, but is firm about keeping certain details off the record. I have agreed to this beforehand, and itrsquo;s the reason hersquo;s condescended to meet me.

The bar is filling up now, mostly locals from Wellawatte, obviously regulars who look curiously at us before joining their own cliques, leaving the cubicle to us.

David Blacker: So you donrsquo;t mind staying here in Little Jaffna?

Major Rohan: (With a shrug) Itrsquo;s just a short visit. Besides, Irsquo;m not bothered about Tamils. My war with the Tigers is over now, no?

DB: So tell me a bit about yourself. Yoursquo;re ex-Sri Lanka Army, right?

MR: Correct. I joined in the early nineties. My backgroundrsquo;s mostly infantry, and later special forces. Towards the end I was also in Int, but not very long.

DB: So the question you must hear a lot - why did you leave?

MR: Actually itrsquo;s usually ldquo;Why did you join?rdquo; but anyway. Yeah, I left because I thought I was wasting my time. I saw a hell of a lot of combat in the nineties, first as an infantry officer, and then in special forces. My time with Int was what convinced me to get out. The war wasnrsquo;t really going well, no one cared about fighting it properly. There was a stupid CFA on with our fellows getting the worst of it. I was married with a young daughter, and wanted a better life for my family.

DB: But Iraq?

MR: Itrsquo;s not so bad (laughs). My wife and daughter live in Dubai and are very safe and happy.

DB: So didnrsquo;t you feel yoursquo;d had enough of war?

MR: It wasnrsquo;t really a war or no war choice. Just a career move. Irsquo;m trained and experienced in this business. When I was thinking of leaving the Army, I met a batchmate of mine. He had resigned his commission a year or two previously and was working as a security consultant in Oman. He had this idea of setting up his own company for operations in Iraq, and wanted me to be his partner. Hersquo;s not a combat man - logistics and supply is his field - and he needed an infantryman. I agreed and quit the Army soon after, and we set up a security firm in Kuwait called Vampyr Group.

DB: So it was just you two?

MR: No, no, of course not. I convinced two other officers to join us. Both have special forces backgrounds, and one of them is probably the best close protection expert Sri Lanka has ever had.

DB: Then what?

MR: Well two of us moved to Kuwait immediately and started looking for business. The other two stayed here and started recruiting ex-soldiers to move to the Middle East and begin work. Soon after, we decided to move our HQ to Qatar for logistical reasons, and it was easier to shut down Vampyr and set up a new company altogether.

DB: So what are you guys called now?

MR: I donrsquo;t want that publicized, sorry.

DB: Why not? Wonrsquo;t it be good for business?

MR: We have plenty of business, thanks, and whoever wants us knows how to find us. (He doesnrsquo;t point out that probably none of his potential clients read my blog, and Irsquo;m grateful for that) Our main problem is that some of the soldiers we recruit are deserters and we have to do various things to get them out of the country. I donrsquo;t want to get into problems with the government so better I keep a low profile. Thatrsquo;s why I donrsquo;t want my name or picture publicized either. I rarely even come to Sri Lanka these days, but I had a funeral in my motherrsquo;s family so I was forced to visit.

DB: OK, no problem. But why are you using deserters? Do you think theyrsquo;re good soldiers?

MR: It depends. Some are, and some are not. We want the good ones. Most of our guys have left the Army legitimately with good records. And just because some have deserted doesnrsquo;t mean theyrsquo;re cowards, OK? Soldiers go absent from the Sri Lanka Army for many reasons, and mostly itrsquo;s not because theyrsquo;re scared. Many are highly decorated for bravery. Usually itrsquo;s because of family and personal problems. A girlfriend is being promised to another man because the boyfriend is in the Army and never around. So he absents himself to marry her. Sometimes he comes back and everything is OK, but sometimes the wife doesnrsquo;t want him to go back to the Army and he has to choose between loyalty to his unit and love for his wife. So he deserts. Or a parent is sick and has no one to care for them. The soldier is stuck in the north, and canrsquo;t get leave. So when he does get some leave, he doesnrsquo;t go back. There are lots and lots of reasons. Many of these fellows like military life, just not the Sri Lankan military life, so my company offers them a better one, working with like-minded professionals and earning a good salary. Theyrsquo;re all well insured, medical and life, so they donrsquo;t need to worry about their families if they are killed or crippled.

DB: So what are their contracts like?

MR: I donrsquo;t want to go into financial detail, but it depends on their experience. We need all sorts - bodyguards for close protection details, security teams for convoy and perimeter protection, specialist drivers, things like that. We even have IT guys and electronics experts, plus our own mechanics for our vehicle pool. Usually itrsquo;s a one-year contract thatrsquo;s renewable. Many of our chaps just come for a year or two, make their money and then go back, but some like the work and stay with us, or move to other markets like Afghanistan or Africa. We also hire consultants for short-contract work, depending on what we need.

DB: So itrsquo;s an all-Sri Lankan company?

MR: Almost totally. All our operators, NCOs, and almost all the officers are Sri Lankan. Therersquo;s a bit of a language issue at the lower level because most of the operators speak only Sinhala, though wersquo;re always pushing them to learn English, so itrsquo;s easier to just have Sri Lankans. But one of our original partners quit the company a year ago, and we replaced him with an Indian ex-police officer who is an anti-terrorism expert, and thatrsquo;s gone off quite well. Also, many of our consultants are non-Sri Lankan. We have used UAVs for some jobs, and we had an ex-USAF lady attached to us for six months (our only female employee!), and later an Israeli guy doing the same thing. We also do some training jobs for other security companies that are new to the area, so we have their people attached for short periods.

DB: Isnrsquo;t there a lot of competition? I mean, the private military business in Iraq is huge, with big boys like Blackwater getting all the headlines and big contracts. How do smaller outfits like yours survive?

MR: Itrsquo;s like any business, David. There are big clients and medium and small clients. Companies like Blackwater get all the big government contracts and thatrsquo;s fine. Wersquo;re not interested in those. We specialize in other areas and cater to a smaller-sized clientele, mostly commercial companies doing business in Iraq who need our expertise. I mean, there are tiny outfits in Iraq, with less than twelve people, but they have enough of work and are making good money.

DB: So how is your company set up? I mean, do you operate like a military unit with platoons and sections, or more like a mercantile firm, with business teams and managers?

MR: I think wersquo;re definitely set up along military lines, and discipline is very very tight. It has to be. But therersquo;s no shouting and saluting like in the Army! If you donrsquo;t do your job yoursquo;ll be sacked like any private firm. You canrsquo;t come late to work and just expect your salary to be cut, no? Someone might get killed because of your negligence. In structure, wersquo;re like a special forces squadron, but a bit bigger. We have a recruiting centre here in Sri Lanka, and a training and logistics base in Qatar. Our forward operating base is in an Iraqi city, and thatrsquo;s where most of our personnel are based. The company is divided into troops, we have a Support Troop under one managing partner, which handles logistics and other support, including finances and most of its people are in Dohar; a Training Troop under another partner for recruitment and training, which has people here and in Qatar; a HQ Troop in Iraq, with two of the managing partners, and then four rifle troops which are used for jobs as and when needed.

DB: Donrsquo;t you feel at a disadvantage when looking for clients. Wouldnrsquo;t clients be more inclined to pick European or American security companies with white personnel from more recognized armies?

MR: Not really. I think we have a more discerning clientele who need our more specialized skills. For instance, being Asian, we attract less attention in a place like Iraq, where an American or British operator with their white skin will be immediately identified as a target. Our clients are often Asian companies doing business in Iraq - Indians, Southeast Asians, and even South Americans or Africans - and our guys can just blend in with them and look like part of their staff. Also, you wonrsquo;t believe what a reputation the Sri Lanka Army has built over the years. Clients know wersquo;ve been fighting terrorists for decades, so they know we have a lot of experience.

DB:OK, but what about the danger? We all know Iraqrsquo;s one of the most dangerous places on earth, and you are right there doing a very dangerous job. We hear about the kidnappings and executions of security personnel, about ambushes. Have you ever thought you were going to be killed over there?

MR:Well things are not as unstable as they were a couple of years ago, but three months ago I was personally involved in an incident. We had a client based in Baghdad, and he was expecting a senior board member to arrive on an inspection. The guest was a Bangladeshi, and because he was a VIP, the client had requested I personally handle the security. He flew into Baghdad and everything went well for the thirty-six hours he was in the country. He was due to fly out to Amman in Jordan, but changed his mind. He was supposed to visit one of their sites in Jordan, close to the Iraqi border, and instead of flying to Amman and then going out to the site, he decided he would drive across the border and check out the site on the way. We advised against it but the guy insisted. We started the trip late in the morning, but an hour out of Baghdad, we noticed two cars shadowing us. Fifteen minutes later, we spotted a pickup truck broken down by the side of the road. We were suspicious, and moving at high speed in a four-car convoy. I was in the clientrsquo;s car, with one lead car and two trail cars. I slowed the entire convoy down, and sent the lead car past the pickup at high speed with guns ready. Just after the lead car passed it, the pickup blew. Luckily they were armoured and the terra who triggered the IED mistimed it a bit. But their tires were in pieces and they couldnrsquo;t move on their own. So I got the clientrsquo;s car to do a U-turn with one trail car, while the other trail car went and picked up the three men from the lead car. In the middle of the U-turn, we took fire from the embankment on the other side of the highway, as well as an RPG from the nearer side. The terras were trying to RPG the trail car escorting us and block the road so that they could kidnap us. Luckily, the RPG missed and we took off in three cars back to Baghdad. I counted six bullet holes in my car later. That doesnrsquo;t happen very often these days, but you canrsquo;t say.

DB: We see all these pictures of American PMCs in full combat kit, with night vision and M16s and stuff. What kind of weapons and kit does your company use?

MR: Well we use whatever technology we need to get the job done, but when it comes to small arms and support weapons we usually use Chinese and Russian stuff. Our operators have been using these for years in the Sri Lanka Army, so it saves a lot of training time.

DB: So what about the ethics of what you do? I mean yoursquo;re fighting and maybe killing just for money - not for your country, or for a cause. Many people think of PMCs or mercenaries as criminals at worst or slightly shady characters at best. What do you think about that?

MR: Irsquo;m not bothered about people like that. Irsquo;m a businessman providing a service. Itrsquo;s a very useful service. I provide security, and that helps save the lives of many many people who just want to go about their own business without being killed or captured by terrorists or criminals. Whatrsquo;s wrong with that?

DB: Just recently, Equatorial Guinea sentenced Simon Mann, an ex-SAS mercenary to a long prison term for his activities in the same field as you. Donrsquo;t you worry about that?

MR: You mean that bugger who tried to overthrow the government in Guinea, no? (I nod) Well what he did was totally different. Those ‘Dogs of Warrsquo; days are over, you know. He should have known better. Security companies are now very legitimate and therersquo;s lots of legitimate, legal, lucrative business available for professional soldiers and security experts. Why do you need to overthrow a country. I think he was stupid, and now is paying for it. Sad, but stupid.

DB: So where do you see yourself in ten years - not in Iraq, I guess?

MR: Hopefully not (he laughs). No, I donrsquo;t want to be based in the middle of the action all the time. Irsquo;d like to diversify a bit more, provide more services that are useful outside of immediate war zones. Therersquo;s a trend even among NGOs and the UN to use private contractors now more and more, and thatrsquo;s an area Irsquo;d like to look into.

DB: Do you think your services will ever be required here in Sri Lanka?

MR: Not really. Not the sort of services I provide now, but as I said, diversificationrsquo;s the name of the game, so wersquo;ll see. The MoD contracts many foreign specialists for particular jobs, and maybe those contracts could be taken by guys like me.

DB: Irsquo;m ex-Army myself. Do you think you could give me a job?

MR: I think yoursquo;re a bit too ex for us, but thanks for asking.

DB: Fuck off.

MR: Yoursquo;re welcome.

This post sent to Groundviews by the author and originally appeared here.

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A top Sri Lankan judge has called for laws such as a freedom of information act to enable people greater access to information to create an 'informed public' that is essential for a democratic society.

Justice Saleem Marsoof, President's Counsel and Judge of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka said most democracies now have legislation providing a mechanism through which the public can have access to information.

These include the Freedom of Information Acts of the United States and the United Kingdom and the Right to Information Act of India.[link]

My view is that the action of the Cultural and the Sports Ministers stink of the worst kind of duplicity and mirrors the reaction of the other political parties in Sri Lanka.

The Tourism Ministry sponsored the much-hyped Hikkaduwa Beach Carnival to coincide with the SAARC heads of state meeting earlier this month. There they were plenty of foreign women clad in even less attire energetically gyrating to the beat of trance and house music, to the delight of hundreds of people who where present. Is this keeping with the so-called Sri Lankan culture? The same Government that objects to the women in Dambulla had spent money to bring down these foreign women to perform in Hikkaduwa and yet, I havenrsquo;t read about anyone objecting it.

Did foreign cheerleaders became an issue in Dambulla simply because the Sports and Cultural Ministers feel that the spectators from a particular class of society who watch cricket need moral policing?

Surprisingly, the UNP General Secretary Tissa Attanayaka has also gone on record saying they are against foreign dancers performing at cricket matches. That stinks of even worse hypocrisy than the Cultural Ministerrsquo;s ramblings. Wasnrsquo;t it the UNP that introduced mini-skirt wearing newsreaders to the national television station and later got castigated for it by the then Opposition? How culturally correct was that move by the UNP? As expected, the JVP and the JHU too have jumped on the anti-foreign cheerleaders bandwagon saying pretty much the same thing, albeit with more froth and pulpit fervour.  

If you look at the bigger picture, how relevant is cricket to the Sri Lankan culture. Isnrsquo;t it a sport we are clinging onto jealously as if it is an indigenous invention when we all know itrsquo;s another remnant of our colonial past? How many things that are alien to our culture have we adapted? Are we to discard all of them because some politician thinks it goes against his prudish and misguided morality?

If politicians think they are qualified to set moral standards, they themselves need to adhere to what they decree. Today, we all know that the politically powerful and elite have one set of rules while the ordinary people of this country have another.   

We donrsquo;t need politicians to set moral standards. The Cultural Minister can start by setting out a moral code for his colleagues and asking them to live by it.

If he succeeds, he can include it in his partyrsquo;s election manifesto the next time around.

• Minister of what?????



• Amnesty Campaign: Some quick thoughts



• Provincial Election Campaign: Battling for the Centre?



• On Democratic Innings



• Sloppy Journalism?

If a weather expert tells you what the weather will be on a specific day next year, you can safely ignore him. If he tells you a hurricane is heading your way, it's a good idea to get out of the way, even if the storm ends up turning. That's playing the odds.

Likewise, if an economist tries to tell you where the stock market will be in a year, you can safely ignore that. But if he tells you a gas tax holiday is an unambiguously bad idea, that's worth listening to, especially if economists on both sides of the aisle agree.

If you think it is okay to ignore economists because they are so often wrong, you're looking at the wrong questions. Economists are generally wrong with complicated models but right about concepts. For example, they know that additional domestic drilling won't make much of a dent in the energy problem. And they know that free trade is generally good for all economies. (You can argue with my examples, but the point is that some things are generally known by economists while not being understood by the general public.) [link]

• Just before I left the country, His Excellency (no doubt under the influence of the JHU, the all-monk party in government) banned Internet porn in Sri Lanka. Now they seem to have some adult password, for people who still want to watch porn, going against our Buddhist morals. Or something like that. There's a new satirical blog on the issue. Very entertaining.
  
  
• Zimbabwe, which has the world's highest inflation, has a new currency -- gasoline coupons. More at the Beacon, Independent Institutes's revitalized blog which is latest addition to my 'regular reads' list. (initial pointer via Tyler Cowen)
  
  
• Here's a great video on School Choice from Yes, Prime Minister. British Comedy at it's best. (HT: Club for Growth)
  
  
• The Mint has an article on privatizing dogs as a solution for the problem of stray dogs in India. That is, basically all dogs should be owned by someone and stray dogs should be put on sale by the municipalities to be purchased by anyone including animal rights activists. I agree in principle, although I don't see this happening. That's not a reason for not discussing it though. First step in changing things is spreading ideas.
  
  
• and finally via Amit Varma links to these two very interesting pieces on the Kashmiri Secessionist tendencies. This by Swaminathan Aiyar for TOI and Vir Sanghavi for Hindustan Times. The situation in Kashmir, in my opinion, weakens the case of the Sri Lankan federalists as a solution for the conflict here. For every example of successful integration with greater regional autonomy, there are counter examples. Nation building is indeed a complex science. It's rather fitting then, that I was in Quebec for the last two weeks. More on that later.

In his nationally televised dialogue with audiences in several areas on Tuesday August 19^th, President Rajapakse, speaking in Sinhala to largely Sinhala rural crowds, pledged to hold elections to the Northern Provincial Council within a year of its liberation just as he had held election to the Eastern Provincial Council. He added that he was considering elections to the local authorities in Jaffna very much earlier.

Gotabhaya Rajapakse, Defence Secretary, had already indicated the goal in his response to The Times online, stressing the need to privilege a common Sri Lankan identity over and above our separate ethnic identities, allowing for devolution of power, and reiterating the Presidentrsquo;s commitment to it.

In the context of a negotiated settlement the post-war order is shaped by all who sit around the table, including the peacemakers. However, given the nature of the LTTE, and as Kethesh Loganathan used to point out, the appeasement by the international community and Colomborsquo;s civil society, a peaceful settlement of Sri Lankarsquo;s conflict has repeatedly proved impossible.

Sri Lanka will get beyond the war to a post-war situation because of the military victory scored by the Sri Lankan armed forces, made possible under the political leadership of the Rajapakse presidency. In a context where the post war moment is the result of a war, the post-war order is decided upon by those who led, fought in and supported the war.

There can be no national identity without a unified national territory. It is unrealistic to expect those - national or international, Sinhala, Tamil or Muslimndash; who opposed the war of liberation, those who practiced a policy of appeasement, who acted as proxies for the enemy, to be stakeholders in deciding or shaping the post-war order. Notwithstanding the academic exercises debating Sri Lankan identity by those who opposed the necessary war through which Sri Lanka must be reunited as a single sovereign territorial space, the post-war order, the crucible of evolving national identity, will almost certainly be decided by those - Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim; national, regional and international-who stood shoulder to shoulder in, or stood with, or at least did not stand against, the anti-fascist war of national reunification. 

As we make the transition into the last stage-though not phase-of the conventional war against the LTTE, it is wise to have a clear idea of what comes after. It is in this context that the debate on devolution must be placed.

Those who advocate the non-implementation of the 13^th amendment, as well as those who advocate only its partial, rather than full implementation, have not taken into account the realities of post-mid intensity conflict warfare, that is the low intensity conflict that will doubtless follow the defeat of ldquo;the conventional military power of Tamil Eelamrdquo; mdash; as the late columnist ldquo;Tarakirdquo; used to call it.

The Sri Lankan military and STF will doubtless be required to follow up the conventional military victory with the complete and final elimination of the LTTE as a military force, destroying its columns in jungle warfare, its cells in urban counter-terrorist warfare, uprooting its organisational infrastructure and its weapons caches.

What has to be avoided is a situation in which the Tigers, their proxies or substitutes, succeed in winning by other means that which they could not win by military means. The mighty USSR fell without a shot being fired, having defended itself, Europe and the world, against the armies of Nazi fascism. Therefore it is necessary to avoid what the Chinese Communist leadership has correctly called the dangers of ldquo;peaceful evolutionrdquo;.

Even after the shooting stops, the 6^th amendment to the Constitution which bans secessionism must be strictly enforced with regard to the LTTE and its proxies. The LTTE should be banned. Its proxies should be treated as Spain, a member of the EU, treats Herri Batasuna, the parliamentary party of Basque separatism, which has been proscribed by the respected judge Baltazar Garzon as a party which ldquo;maintains links with an underground armed organisationrdquo;.

There is however, an important corollary. The ban on the espousal of separatism in Spain and India is regarded as legitimate because it takes place in a system that contains generous autonomy for ethnic or ethno-lingual regions. Therefore, the implementation of the devolution of power to the provinces must parallel this strict enforcement of the ban on separatism.

The Sri Lankan armed forces will have to stay in the North and East for as long as is needed but not a moment longer than is needed. If we pull out prematurely due to manipulated demands from Tamil politicians, endorsed by regional or global players wielding carrots and sticks, it will be at the risk of the reactivation of the Tigers and/or the Tamil Eelam struggle.

There will have to be a long-term Sri Lankan armed forces presence in the North and East, positioned in such a configuration and of such a strength that can suppress, pre-empt and deter any sign of separatist-terrorist activity.

As importantly or even more so, there will have to be a constantly modernised Sri Lankan combined services presence guarding our porous borders against the largest source of anti-Sri Lankan sentiment, namely Tamil Nadu.

However, if the Sri Lankan armed forces presence is too large, too obtrusive, remains largely mono-ethnic and mono-religious, and has too many abrasive functions in relation to Tamil society and public life, we risk exactly the same danger. Our armed forces would then have the profile of an army of occupation, with peaceful protests erupting, and violent incidents being flashed around the world, giving credence to the cause of separatism. We must avoid a replay of the whole experience ranging from the socially insensitive conduct of TAFAII through the suppression of the Satyagraha of 1961 to the brutal retaliatory tactics of the early 1980s.

Let us learn the lesson of Israel. It is a society and a people whose achievement ranges from the ancient Biblical texts to ultra-modernity: instead of resting on its heritage which is a foundational part of Western civilisation, in the 60 years since its founding it has produced eight Nobel Prize winners. However, Israel is locked in conflict, unable to fulfil its brilliant potential in the world. The turning point was in 1967. Neither Moshe Dayan and his Generals who won the Six Day War so spectacularly, nor Prime Minister Golda Meir, ever planned to remain in permanent occupation of Arab land. When he saw his paratroopers praying at the Wailing Wall, Moshe Dayan snorted ldquo;whatrsquo;s this, the Vatican?rdquo; and ordered the pulling down of an Israeli flag flying over a sacred Islamic site. Today, his daughter Yael Dayan, a decorated war veteran, writer and Deputy Mayor, is a leading figure protesting against the building of the ldquo;security wallrdquo;.

The impulse for encroachment on and annexation of Arab/Palestinian land, turning a brilliant military victory into the political quagmire of permanent occupation, came not from the largely Westernized, sophisticated Israeli politico-military ruling elite, but from native Jewish ultranationalist religious fundamentalists.   

This is where devolution comes in. The issue of land is at the heart of civic conflict in many regions of the world, Israel/Palestine being only the worst or the best known. Nothing is as emotive and nothing is guaranteed to give any armed forces presence a profile of an army of occupation as unsettled questions of land, involving the peasantry.

An exhaustive discussion on Land in relation to devolution took place between the Governments of Sri Lanka and India and a complex formula was arrived at. Whether or not it is adhered to, one can envisage land being a bone of contention in the North and the East, but the danger in non-adherence is that we shall not have India on our side or even neutral in any such dispute. If India is alienated from us, so too will be everyone else. A land dispute in the East is also likely to involve the Muslim community, and if so, our valuable support from Pakistan, Iran and the OIC (the 52 nation Organization of the Islamic Conference) will stand in jeopardy.

If the Tamil citizens of the East, especially the peasantry, are locked in a protracted confrontation with the Sinhala community, the state or the armed forces over land, it will be impossible for our Tamil allies the TMVP to stand aside. If the TMVP were to move against the Tamil people it would weaken their base. If they moved against the Sinhalese it would weaken our profile, reducing it to a Sinhala Only one. 

It would therefore be profoundly counter-productive for us NOT to implement fully, the 13^th amendment, including on the subject of land.

Matters are as clear when it comes to the issue of police powers. Unlike in the case of a conventional war, no low intensity conflict/counter-insurgency has ever been won without a major role for local forces and this still truer when the conflict has a dimension of identity, i.e. when the insurgent and statersquo;s armed forces are drawn from different ethno-national, linguistic or religious groups. ldquo;Chechenisationrdquo; was a cornerstone of Vladimir Putinrsquo;s victory over the ferocious Chechen secessionist terrorist army. 

In the absence of local forces, the conflict becomes one between an army of occupation and the people of the area. The state requires an intermediary layer to avoid such polarization. If these local forces are not to remain irregular militia which could lapse into banditry, they have to be incorporated into the system and subject to the rule of law. This is where the granting of police powers to the Provincial Councils as per the 13^th amendment, comes in handy.

In a recent, widely reported speech in Canada, Prof Ratnajeevan Hoole, whose scholarly credentials I greatly respect, has made an incomplete identification of the choices facing the Tamil people. He lists separation, federalism and assimilation. Having obliquely indicated a preference for the first option, he rules it out as unfeasible. He concludes with a robust call for federalism through international involvement. Prof Hoole unwittingly gives comfort to those Sinhala extremists who argue that Tamil moderates are closet Eelamists who prefer Tamil Eelam if it were feasible, would settle for federalism only because separation is not an option at the moment and would stretch federalism to the point of separation if given half a chance.

This leaves one with the realisation that the only realists among the moderate Tamils are not in the Diaspora, but on the island, and represented by Douglas Devananda, Chief Minister Chandrakanthan and Col. Karuna, i.e. the EPDP and TMVP. 

Prof Hoole also makes a grave analytical error in his identification of options. A glance around the world would show him that there is a fourth option, namely the devolution of power/autonomy within a unitary system, as practiced in the UK, China and the Philippines (if I were to name but three diverse examples). This is the option arrived at under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, which could not be implemented primarily (but not exclusively) because the LTTE went to war against the IPKF. Once that armed spoiler is out of the way, the devolution option becomes practicable.

Provincial autonomy as contained in the 13^th amendment must be saved from two quarters: those who would seek to move beyond it by vaulting over it, and those who seek to dismantle, delay or dilute it.     

The Tamil community must be liberated from the structural political impasse they find themselves in. The Sinhalese must be emancipated from the structural economic-developmental, institutional and human resources impasse they find themselves in. Post-war Sri Lanka needs to catch up with the rest of Asia, the high growth area of the world. These objectives require a policy of Defence and Devolution.

(These are the personal views of the writer).

• TAMIL NADU, THE INDIAN MODEL AND DEVOLUTION



• What Can We Expect from the APRC?



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• The Best and Worst Tea in Sri Lanka

It is topless people, men and women, in a public place, which is perfectly legal under our Bill of Rights and under New Zealand law. Mr McCoskrie [director of Family First] keeps harping on that it is pornography. They are breasts; they're not a big deal.

They had also sent a letter and a fax previously, which sadly we did not have the time or funds to respond to. This time though, we followed it up. We decided to post a small parcel of books to Jaffna which resulted in some rather revealing incidents at the General Post Office (in Colombo) as narrated by our Publications Clerk (lets call her Jenny).

The books were taken in a package that wasn’t sealed so that postal staff could inspect it. Those who have been to the GPO will know that the multitude of queues for each activity - weighing, buying stamps, sealing, stamping and registering. The whole idea seems to be to find a way to waste as much of the tax-payer’s time and energy as possible.

But I digress.

On this day, upon seeing the package, a woman in the stamps queue started shouting ldquo;Menna menna jaffna walata parcel ekak!rdquo; (Here! Here! A parcel to Jaffna! in Sinhala) as if the package was contained dynamite.

ldquo;Oh goodness! A parcel to JAFFNA! Someone COME here at ONCE! Check this!rdquo; went out the shouting. Others in the queue shifted slightly away from Jenny.

Out came another woman - an official with the self-important air of one.  She proceeded to minutely inspect the incendiary package and interrogate poor Jenny with questions like ldquo;Why are you sending books to Jaffna?!rdquo;, her incredulity and suspicion stressing the words books and Jaffna.

Jenny replied cautiously, “We are sending books to a Library in Jaffna”.

About a quarter hour of inspection and interrogation followed. It was evident that the postal staff did not believe that anyone could have any legitimate reason to send books to the embattled Northern city.

After the package was neatly packaged, the postal staff then decided to strip it all apart and re-package it. Jenny did not bother to ask what the reasoning behind this was.

It is now about a month since the parcel was sent. We have phoned and followed up by speaking to the Library concerned and they have not received it yet.

As a Librarian I disgusted by people who destroy books. Who destroy learning. However, the sad fact of the matter is that there are people so blinded by racism and paranoia who will continue to obstruct and impede the process of reconciliation.

How is it that we have come to inhabit a country where sending books to a library is seen as an act that’s abnormal? Unnecessary? Even partial to terrorism?

Maybe this is why peace eludes us even when we are supposedly fighting a war for it.

• My life and my choices in a country at war: A personal reflection



• Queue For Pongal Rice



• Robberies Increase In Jaffna



• Chikenguniya Spreads In Jaffna



• Responding to Sumanasri Liyanage: On Mahinda bowing down to the ‘differing majority’ and On changing the terminology from ‘federal’ to ‘power sharing’

Sixty years later, I do not laugh at the words any more. I see their wisdom particularly in relation to the resolution of our ethnic conflict. They seem to indicate the way to put an end to this cancerous problem.

ldquo;Hurry uprdquo; implies urgency, commitment and absence of prevarication. The ethnic problem has dragged on for 60 years after independence and there has never been a dedicated commitment to resolve it. Dilly dallying has always been the order of the day. Wisdom demands that all stake-holders assume a genuine sense of immediacy to put an end to the awful dispute.

ldquo;Gordquo; is a command to start immediately. On record we have started more than eight decades ago but really we are still where we started, if not even further behind. If commissions, committees, conferences, seminars, debates and draft bills mean anything, our lsquo;make-believersquo; of ‘goingrsquo; may be unparalleled in history. Wisdom demands that we start without humbugging.

ldquo;Slowlyrdquo; denotes circumspection, patience, and foresight. We have to see all around us, be patient enough to respect opposite views and be mindful of the consequences of our actions. That is just what we have failed to do all these years. Most of the time we have been bogged down in emotive words like ‘federalrsquo;, ‘unitaryrsquo;, lsquo;patriotismrsquo; and ‘sole representativersquo;. Words have been the bane of our life.

Upatissa who later became the Chief Disciple of Lord Buddha under the name of ‘Sariputtarsquo;, met Rev. Assajee, a Buddhist monk once and inquired from him as to what the Buddha taught. On being told that it was a vast subject, Sariputta-to-be remarked ldquo;attheneva me attho. kin kahasi vyanjanan bahunrdquo; (I need only the essence. Of what use is a cacophony of words?)

Unfortunately, most of us who hold Arahat Sariputta in utmost reverence do not appear to follow his words of wisdom in practice. If we did we would have made much headway with our ethnic problem by now.

The UNP appears to have seen some wisdom in these words, when they removed the word ‘federalrsquo; from their political vocabulary. Although they have been maligned as deceitful ‘turn-coatsrsquo; when they did this, it has to be appreciated that it is the jettisoning of that word that has brought them closer to a consensus. Imaginably and hopefully, the jettisoning does not affect what they want to do for the minorities.

Going slow also implies gradual progress in the correct direction, a ‘step by steprsquo; approach. We have always wanted to take quantum leaps but tarried at the very beginning, due to controversies about the final destination. This reminds one of the nervous driver who does not start his car because he is worried about crossing the Maradana Junction.

Controversy is not a dirty word. It helps in the clarification of issues and the choice of options and brings about equilibrium. In that sense, we have to be thankful to rivals on both sides of the ethnic ‘tug-of-warrsquo;. If not for the force of their pull, the rope would have been snatched away to one side or the other long ago.

Political leaders should be astute enough to act at the point the marker on the rope comes to the ‘nadu centerrsquo;, as the Tamils call it. One occasion it was at the ‘nadu centerrsquo; was when the Thirteenth Amendment was passed.

It is foolish to idle because the ideal is not possible. We can only achieve the optimum practicable at any point in time depending on the balance of forces currently operative. In this sense, the Presidentrsquo;s declared move to implement the Thirteenth Amendment appears to be a first step in the right direction. May be no party agrees unreservedly to this move. Only it happens to be a move that no one would seriously oppose.

In fact it is a step backwards for we are supposed to have taken it 20 years ago. Nevertheless it would be a step forward in the sense that we have been going backwards since the Amendment. However it is important that the Amendment is implemented in full and in real earnest for it has been since diluted mostly by the greed of politicians in power to expand their ‘empiresrsquo; and the misguided priorities of the national budget.

To think that implementing the Thirteenth Amendment is the end of the race would be deceiving oneself for want of a sense of history. The sincerity with which the Amendment is implemented should generate greater trust among the communities which in turn would doubtlessly make the stake-holders more amenable to greater consensus on further progress.

‘Gorsquo; also demands that we move forward on a time frame that would be practicable after the successful implementation of the Amendment. In the light of past experience the next possible optimum move appears to be the adoption of the Draft Constitution of 2000 or an improved version of it made possible by the ‘breaking of the icersquo; by the previous move.

Perhaps it is too early in the day to visualize where we ‘gorsquo; after implementing the Thirteenth Amendment on which we are already focused. Besides conjecturing on further moves at this stage faces the danger of initiating another controversy that would hold back even the promised ‘small mercyrsquo;. Let us not upset the hornetsrsquo; nests within sight of the Sigiri frescos. Our destination is the top of the rock.

Let us get ourselves going now and cross bridges when we come to them. It may well be that none of us living today would come to the last bridge. It would be crossed by our progeny who by then would have developed a mind-set capable of crossing the bridge with ease. They will make decisions on the dictates of their own social and intellectual environment. It is dogmatic and futile to dictate terms to future generations on the strength of existing power bases.

This does not mean that we do not have a role to play. Our obligation is to develop policies that would facilitate the crossing, not to mention the avoidance of false steps that would vitiate the atmosphere and embarrass a final resolution.

It is also important to realize that we do not have the status to dictate to the powers that would preside over the destiny of a future electorate that would carry the baby beyond the reform within our sight. That electorate would be influenced in their choice by the imperatives of their own environment.

Our immediate task then, is to ‘hurry uprsquo; with the Thirteenth Amendment. That happens to be the most pragmatic move immediately possible. Then we must lsquo;go slowlyrsquo;, but progressively, step by step, towards a harmonious, integrated and equitable Sri Lanka with honesty of purpose and commitment.

We have also to make way for those coming after us by removing road-blocks and implementing conducive and proactive policies that would facilitate them to progressively make optimum decisions towards the ideal. Even after ten Prabhakarans, Peace will not dawn on us until the system makes it possible for every citizen to share and share alike the bounteous legacy of this land.

• APRC: The Year of the Rat has begun



• In Search of a Peace Package



• Terraffic



• Diaspora lsquo;Wisdomrsquo; - An interview with Lionel Bopage



• Post Arbour

The Presidentrsquo;s decision to include the Treasury Secretary P.B. Jayasundera in his delegation to China for the opening ceremony of the Olympic games days is a case in point. Just days after the man found guilty of corruption in the privatization of Lanka Marine Services Limited by the Supreme Court and fined Rs. 500,000, the Presidentrsquo;s action illustrates that anybody has a place in the regimersquo;s inner circle as long as he is a ldquo;yes man.rdquo;

The Court upheld the findings of a the report released months earlier by the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) which said that the privatisation of LMSL when Jayasundera served as the Chairman of Public Enterprise Reforms Commission (PERC) had been ldquo;executed blatantly without Cabinet approval, with several flaws causing loss and detriment to the Government.rdquo; But the abject failure to act against those named in the Report meant it took Public Interest Litigation initiated in the Supreme Court to name Jayasundera as a guilty party in the LMSL case.

Even though the Government is slow to act against such persons, we got to know last week that two police officers attached to the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption were abruptly transferred out of the department while they were probing the assets of a Government (non-Cabinet) Minister. In their fundamental rights application filed in the SC, the petitioners made a shock revelation that two top officials in the Bribery Commission - Commissioner Indra De Silva, who is also a former IGP and Director (Investigations) Neville Guruge - were attempting to cover up the case against the Minister.

A look at some of the convictions that the Commission has to its credit amply shows that while the sharks cut their way out of the bribery net, itrsquo;s the small fry that is gets caught. A Police Constable was convicted in 2002 for accepting a bribe of Rs. 2,000 to refrain from filing a case for a Traffic Offence. His punishment from Court was two years imprisonment for each charge. A minor employee of a government office was convicted for a bribe of Rs. 2,000 and got 12 months imprisonment. Another Police constable who accepted a bribe of Rs. 300 for a traffic offence was convicted and got two years rigorous imprisonment.

Clearly, engaging in bribery and corruption must be punished irrespective of the sum of money involved. But going by the severity of the punishment that has been meted out to the three persons I have cited as examples, I ask you to determine what punishment is suitable for a man whose actions have resulted in the loss of millions. Paying Rs. 500,000 as a fine must have been like handing over pocket money for Jayasundara when one recognises the magnitude of the fraud involved in the LMSL case. And this may only be the beginning. Similar irregularities may well come to light in cases such as the privatisation of the Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation, where Jayasundera also figured, that are pending before the Courts. The COPE report said that in the SLIC privatization deal, Jayasundera had ldquo;failed and neglected to act in the interests of the Government.rdquo;

What does inaction against the rot at the top of the ladder tell the ordinary citizen of this country? Steal millions in public money and you are safe to live a life of luxury and comfort and hobnob with the politically powerful but be honest but try to stand up against the rot, all you can expect is to get transferred, demoted, harassed and hounded.

But Jayasundera is only one in a along list of wrongdoers that the President has chosen to mollycoddle even when their atrocities are staring him in his face. There can be no more glaring example than the case of Minster Mervin Silva. The President famously asked Silva to be present at a meeting with employees of the Rupavahini Cooptation who were being signalled out for attacks after the trashing Silva got following his outrageous behaviour against the New Director of the SLRC. What the President did here is pat the man on his back and tell him it is time to stop such attacks. Obviously this sickening molly-coddling has not stopped the man and only encouraged him to worsen his attacks on journalists and media organizations.

And what has come of allegations against a Minister for robbing the money meant as compensation to the farmers affected by the Mavil Aru incident? What of another junior Minister who was allegedly involved in a visa racket to the USA using government influence? What of the fertilizer subsidy tender racket which again meant massive loss of public funds?

The media has to a great extent done its best to bring such issues to the public forum. Some opposition legislators have even attempted to bring them up in Parliament.

Sadly and tragically though, a government blind to bribery and corruption continues to be in deep slumber when confronted with these uncomfortable truths.

• Impeachment of Public Officials



• Letrsquo;s stop corruption in Sri Lanka!



• THE CONTINUING VIOLATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: YET MORE UNCONVINCING EXCUSES



• Significant Other



• Defence Secretary: The epitome of bad governance

August 2008

About this poll

Peace was achieved in Northern Ireland, after many years of bitter conflict, failed negotiations and broken ceasefires only when all the parties to the conflict and the people of Ireland and Northern Ireland were brought together in the same peace process. As part of that process a series of ‘peace pollsrsquo; were run to find out what the people wanted in terms of a just and lasting settlement. The first such peace poll run in Sri Lanka was completed between March and May 2008 in collaboration with the staff of Social Indicator of Colombo and Dr. Colin Irwin from the Institute of Irish Studies at the University of Liverpool who developed the peace polls method. That poll included a random sample of 1,700 people from all parts of Sri Lanka with the exception of the Northern Province. As Social Indicator are presently not able to operate in this region of Sri Lanka arrangements were made for a separate poll to be undertaken by the academic community in Jaffna. This new poll was run in June and repeated all the questions asked in the previous poll with 200 interviews completed in 5 Divisional Secretariats (DS). The full results of both polls are available at the project website http://www.peacepolls.org along with a more detailed explanation of the methodology used.

Introduction

Can the Government of Sri Lanka negotiate a peace agreement with the people of the Northern Province? This question depends of course on a desire and willingness of both the Government in Colombo and the political representatives of the people in the North wanting to negotiate such a peace. But if we assume they do then is there a basis upon which such an agreement could be made between the Sinhala people of Sri Lanka on the one hand and the Tamils of the Northern Province on the other? Both the previous peace poll in this series and political developments in the rest of Sri Lanka suggest that a new dispensation between the Provinces and the Central Government could lead to such a peace. But what of the North, could a similar dispensation lead to peace there? With this point in mind all the questions asked in the first Sri Lanka peace poll were asked again in and around Jaffna. The results suggest, as in the rest of the country, that fully implemented constitutional reform coupled with effective measures to deal with problems of discrimination and good governance would enjoy wide popular support. It therefore follows that bringing the people of the North into the peace process, as full partners for peace could both strengthen the legitimacy of any agreements reached and hopefully make an end to hostilities that much closer.

The Problems

From a list of 51 problems given to the research team the top three items on the Northern Tamil ‘Problemsrsquo; list are ‘Escalating violence in the last 2 yearsrsquo; and ‘Violence over the past 30 yearsrsquo; 1^st and 2^nd, both at 72% ‘very significantrsquo;, followed by ‘The ongoing warrsquo; 3^rd at 71% ‘very significantrsquo;. These items are 4^th, 5^th and 6^th on the Sinhala list so both communities share the same concerns on this point. However, beyond this common appreciation of the violence of war the ‘problemsrsquo; of the two communities diverge. First and 2^nd on the Sinhala list is ‘The continued violence of the LTTErsquo; and ‘Abuse of human rights by the LTTErsquo; at 60% and 59% ‘very significantrsquo; respectively while 3^rd on the Northern Tamil list (after the issues of war) is the ‘Failure to implement language rightsrsquo; at 63% ‘very significantrsquo;. However, after this there is a degree of convergence again between the two lists. ‘Failure to bring human rights violators to justicersquo; is 5^th on the Northern Tamil list and 11^th on the Sinhala list while ‘The failure of successive governments to find a political solutionrsquo; and ‘Failure to provide Sri Lanka Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problemsrsquo; is 6^th and 7^th on the Northern Tamils list and 16^th and 19^th on the Sinhala list (out of a total list of 51 such problems). But ‘The continued violence of the LTTErsquo; and their human rights abuses are down at 38^th and 30^th on the Northern Tamil list while the ‘Failure to implement language rightsrsquo; is 33^rd on the Sinhala list. Clearly not much meeting of minds on these critical issues that must necessarily be addressed by both communities if peace is to be achieved. So what of the ‘solutionsrsquo; to these various ‘problemsrsquo; is there a basis for negotiations there?

The Solutions

Security: In the second part of the questionnaire everyone interviewed was asked to indicate which ‘solutionsrsquo; they considered to be ‘essentialrsquo;, ‘desirablersquo;, ‘acceptablersquo;, ‘tolerablersquo; or ‘unacceptablersquo; for lasting peace and stability in Sri Lanka. The options for security were then listed in order of priority calculated as the average ‘essential or desirablersquo; for both the Northern Tamils and Sinhala community. The first two items on this list are ‘All the people of Sri Lanka must come together through their representatives to solve the problemrsquo; and ‘The political leadership representing all stakeholders must come together to solve the problemrsquo; at between 72% and 85% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for both the Northern Tamil and Sinhala community. Rates of ‘unacceptablersquo; do not rise above 5% for these options. Next comes ‘Bring all IDPs under total civilian controlrsquo; between 67% and 71% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for both communities followed by ‘More inclusive and effective Peace Secretariatrsquo; at 87% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and 51% for the Sinhala of which a 22% minority consider this option to be ‘unacceptablersquo;. A consensus is restored again for ‘Reform the Police and eliminate corruptionrsquo; 5^th on this list of 23 items with rates of ‘unacceptablersquo; at only 3% or 4%. Although the Northern Tamils strongly support the suggestion that ‘The government should also negotiate with the LTTErsquo; at 94% ‘essential or desirablersquo; the Sinhala are split on this proposal at 40% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and 37% ‘unacceptablersquo; with similar results for ‘Restart the peace processrsquo; and ‘Stop the warrsquo; at 8^th and 9^th on this list. Other options in this list then continue to look at these issues in some more detail but the basic conclusion to be drawn is that the Northern Tamils want an end to the war now while the Sinhala community are divided on this strategy. At the time of running this poll 75% still considered defeating the LTTE by military means alone to be ‘essential or desirablersquo; compared to only 17% of Northern Tamils who took this view which perhaps underlines the point that no community should be seen in simple ‘black and whitersquo; terms. What both communities can agree to however is the necessity for their political leaderships to work together for a political solution to the conflict and for the institutions with responsibilities for establishing peace to be more effective and inclusive.

Human Rights: The question on human rights listed a variety of abuses ranging from ‘Attack civiliansrsquo; to ‘Deny freedom of movementrsquo; and everyone interviewed for this question was asked if these actions should be allowed so that the LTTE or ‘government forces, police and associated paramilitariesrsquo; could achieve their respective objectives. Generally speaking the results to this question are very reassuring with the Sinhala recording an average of 96% ‘unacceptablersquo; and Northern Tamils 94% ‘unacceptablersquo; over all. But some results are possibly matters for concern. In the Jaffna sample of Northern Tamils 7% considered LTTE attacks on civilians to be ‘tolerablersquo; and extra-judicial killings by the LTTE ‘acceptable or tolerablersquo; while 5% considered ‘Recruit Child Soldiersrsquo; ‘acceptablersquo; and 9% thought ‘Launch suicide attacksrsquo; was ‘tolerablersquo;. In fairness it should be pointed out that our previous poll showed very little support for these particular kinds of human rights abuses when the various communities were looked at for the rest of Sri Lanka as a whole and it may be the case that a small minority of Sinhala living in the war zones are also wiling to accept lower standards with regards to the observation of these human rights. However 5% of Sinhala do consider it ‘acceptable or tolerablersquo; for the ‘government forces, police and associated paramilitariesrsquo; to ‘Abuse emergency powersrsquo; and this rises to 7% ‘acceptable or tolerablersquo; for ‘Arbitrary arrest and detentionrsquo; and 14% for ‘Deny freedom of movementrsquo;.

Discrimination: There is strong agreement between the two communities on measures needed to address problems of discrimination with ‘Effective steps to ensure balanced access to university educationrsquo; 1^st at 97% and 76% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and Sinhala respectively. This is followed by ‘Effective steps to ensure balanced recruitment in the civil service at all levelsrsquo; at 84% and 69% 2^nd then ‘Distribute the resources of the state on a per capita basisrsquo; at 78% and 65% 3^rd and ‘Affirmative action for rehabilitation and reconstructionrsquo; 4^th at 85% and 57% ‘essential or desirablersquo;. Levels of ‘unacceptablersquo; range between 5% and 13% in the Sinhala community for these policies so they would meet with little resistance but they are split on ‘Ensure full implementation of Tamil as an official languagersquo; at 32% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and 34% ‘unacceptablersquo;. But as this reform is ‘essential or desirablersquo; for 94% of Northern Tamils this particular policy will need to be implemented all be it with some political care (it was also 4^th on the Northern Tamil ‘problemsrsquo; list).

Good Governance: When it comes to measures needed to improve good governance there is very little difference between the two communities. Both Northern Tamils and Sinhala want to ‘Depoliticise the public servicersquo; (81% and 87% ‘essential or desirable); an ‘Independent mediarsquo; (92% and 72%); ‘Effective institutions to combat corruptionrsquo; (79% and 74%); ‘Right to information except for matters of national securityrsquo; (88% and 64%); Reform of the criminal justice systemrsquo; (78% and 75%) and ‘Right to information at all timesrsquo; at 92% and 48% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and Sinhala respectively (of whom 16% are opposed to this policy as ‘unacceptable). Also both Northern Tamils (73% ‘essential or desirablersquo;) and Sinhala (64%) prefer that ‘Appointments of Supreme Court Judges and other high posts should be made on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council established by Parliamentrsquo; rather than at the discretion of the President (61% and 31% ‘essential or desirablersquo; respectively with 31% of Sinhala also opposed to this policy as ‘unacceptablersquo;).

Constitutional Reform: A consensus is reached on the first four items on the constitutional reform priorities for negotiations list. ‘Give equal status to all religious groupsrsquo; is at the top of this list of 27 items with 87% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and 73% for Sinhala. ‘Fully implement the 13^th Amendmentrsquo; is 2^nd at 64% and 68% respectively; ‘Clearly define the powers of the Centre and the Provincesrsquo; 3^rd at 83% and 46% (15% ‘unacceptablersquo; for Sinhala) and then ‘Fully implement the 17^th Amendment 4^th at 47% and 70% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and Sinhala respectively (17% and 13% ‘unacceptable). Clearly all these reforms can be done with the consent of the people. However the top priority for Northern Tamils is that ‘The North and East should be one provincersquo; with 92% stating that it is ‘essential or desirablersquo;. However, it comes in 5^th on the joint list as only 21% of Sinhala share this view and 53% of them are opposed to this reform as ‘unacceptablersquo;. But this item is probably something that will have to be negotiated with Eastern Tamils as well and early indications from their data suggest that they would also support a single province although not as strongly (64% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and 10% ‘unacceptablersquo; in an un-weighted sample from the first poll). The top priority for the Sinhala community is that ‘Sri Lanka should be a unitary statersquo; at 91% ‘essential or desirablersquo; with Northern Tamils opposed to this proposal at 75% ‘unacceptablersquo;. But this leaves about 25% of Northern Tamils with mixed views on this point and this ‘splitrsquo; is reflected in a series of related questions: ‘Two completely separate independent statesrsquo; is considered ‘essential or desirablersquo; by 53% and ‘unacceptablersquo; by 28% of Northern Tamils; ‘Two states in a loose union like Europersquo; is ‘essential or desirablersquo; for 39% but ‘unacceptablersquo; for 24% and finally in the constitutional package question ‘Two statesrsquo; is ‘essential or desirablersquo; for 47% of Northern Tamils and ‘unacceptablersquo; for 27%. This degree of consistency should be taken seriously and when combined with other results such as the full implementation of the 13^th Amendment at 64% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and, for example, ‘Devolution with the same powers for all Provincesrsquo; at 60% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and ‘No devolutionrsquo; at 69% ‘unacceptablersquo; then the prospects for a negotiated peace look very good indeed providing the extremists in both communities can be marginalised.

A Constitutional Package: Finding common ground and marginalising the extremists in any negotiation is never easy but hopefully an objective look at the positions of the two communities on the key constitutional issues will help each side understand better where agreement can be reached. With this point in mind an additional constitutional question was asked that presented the various options put forward by both communities as ‘constitutional packagesrsquo;. As would be expected 95% of Sinhala reject the ‘Two Statersquo; solution as ‘unacceptablersquo; and 83% of Northern Tamils (from the Jaffna sample) reject the ‘Unitary Satersquo; option as ‘unacceptablersquo;. But 58% of Sinhala consider ‘13^th Amendment Devolutionrsquo; ‘essential or desirablersquo; with only 24% opposed to it as ‘unacceptablersquo; while 53% of Northern Tamils consider ‘Enhanced Devolutionrsquo; ‘essential or desirablersquo; with only 7% opposed to it as ‘unacceptablersquo;. ‘Enhanced Devolutionrsquo; (paraphrased here as ‘Full implementation of the 13^th and 17^th Amendments plus the devolution of significant powers to autonomous provinces negotiated at a peace conferencersquo;) is arguably the expressed policy of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) and it is only opposed by 31% of the Sinhala community according to our polls. This may sound like a lot but it isnrsquo;t. For example the successful Belfast Agreement was opposed by 52% of Protestants in a comparable public opinion poll completed just before it was successfully negotiated and subsequently passed in a referendum. Given the political will of the elected representatives of the people of Sri Lanka and the support of the international community a peace agreement should be achievable in Sri Lanka also.

Implementation: Perhaps the problem in Sri Lanka is as much one of implementation as it is a matter of negotiation and with this point in mind two options were tested against public opinion on this issue. Both a Constitutional Council and a Constitutional Court were acceptable and with regard to the International Community India came out on top as the most acceptable partner to help facilitate peace with Norway second for Northern Tamils and SAARC second for the Sinhala. So perhaps the question Sri Lanka and her neighbours need to ask is not can Sri Lanka achieve peace but when?

• Poll results: How do you think we can end the war and attain peace in Sri Lanka?



• Consensus building for peace



• On ldquo;traitorsrdquo; and federalism: Beyond the hypocrisy, towards collaboration



• Traditional solutions for modern day problems



• Please leave us alone; a voice from Muslim community

Sometimes the obvious is the most difficult to see; and then when discerned in a flash of blinding light it does indeed seem so obvious. Lanka will never, never ever, settle its national question, or its ethnic conflict if you prefer this terminology, within its own parameters. That is the inescapable lesson of 60 years of post-independence history. Superficially one can point to the SLFP, the UNP, the LTTE, Bandaranaike, Jayawardena, Prabaharan and so on, but these are merely phenomenological manifestations of things more fundamental. If after the six decades from the disenfranchisement of plantation Tamils, through Sinhala Only legislation, communal riots and carnage, a bloody 25 year long civil war and heinous terrorism, anybody still thinks Lanka can solve this problem within itself, well though loath to quote the Bible, I have no option but to say ldquo;None are so blind as those who have eyes but cannot seerdquo;.

 

Some background

Sinhala-Buddhists are 70% of the population and for reasons reaching rather further back in history than I can recount here except in a sentence or two, the popular belief system of this community has evolved a certain ideology, a short name for which is Mahavamsa consciousness. It is about Lanka being the pristine land of the Sinhalese race, and the repository in which Buddhism was nurtured and salvaged when it was in recess in India and this country ravaged by South Indian invaders followed by four and a half centuries of colonial oppression. Modernists can think what they like of this deep-seated system of beliefs, they can call it the makings of a modern mythology founded on historical truths; no matter, it is the stuff of popular consciousness in this the land of Sinhala-Buddhism. It is learnt in school and temple, it is the substance of common lore and flavoured into motherrsquo;s milk. ldquo;The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the livingrdquo;.

What has any of this to do with todayrsquo;s national question? Simple, this ideology of the Sinhala people is a near insurmountable obstacle to any constitutional dispensation such as a federal system, autonomy for Tamil areas, or substantial devolution and the sharing of power. It is hard for anyone sincerely steeped in Mahavamsa consciousness to reconcile with a Lanka that is not a unitary Sinhala-Buddhist land. Governments, regimes or leaders who toyed with far less dangerous precedents than federalism or autonomy (the B-C Pact of 1957, the Dudley-Chelva Agreement of 1965, the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13^th Constitutional Amendment, Chandrikarsquo;s Draft Constitution in year 2000, the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement and the PTOMS proposals) have all been shown the door. We must learn from this history.

In modern times the evocation of this ideology was the vehicle for the execution of new tasks. The signal phenomenon of the last epoch in Lanka is the emergence of the petty-bourgeoisie to a place of prominence in the post-colonial political constellation. ldquo;Thus the awakening of the dead serves the purpose of glorifying new struggles, not of parodying the old but of magnifying the given task in the imagination, not recoiling from its solution in reality but finding once more the spirit for new struggles, not making a ghost walk againrdquo;. The purpose of celebrating the Mahavamsa ideology for modern class actors, to whatever degree they deluded themselves in their own imagination, was to execute the historic tasks of the moment. Let me explain.

In the decade after independence thanks to a progressive education system and welfare policies, good prices for one of the countries main exports, rubber, and a moderately efficient and relatively uncorrupted public service, prosperity seeped down into the rural areas. A large petty-bourgeois class of small businessmen, schoolteachers, traders and small landowners became more influential and began to play a powerful role in both rural and semi-urban politics. The privileges of the English educated Colombo elite and the entrenched position of the Tamils in government employment and the professions was an obstacle to the social mobility and economic advancement of the rising Sinhala petty-bourgeoisie. A strong Sinhala nationalist movement grew and is identified with the 1956 SLFP election victory, Sinhala Only legislation and Buddhism. The Sinhala Only Act declared the Sinhala language be the only official language of the country - the other option, both Sinhala and Tamil, was championed by the left parties but roundly defeated as a mood of race based antagonism poisoned the country.

What has this to do with todayrsquo;s national question? The rise of the Sinhala petty-bourgeoisie to a place in the sun, because of the specific historical conjunctures and ethnic modalities that mediated what was in essence a class process, nevertheless evolved, in the political landscape, into a manifestly ethnic confrontation.

Indian readers need to appreciate that though similar processes of petty-bourgeoisie ascent hand in hand with a cultural renaissance did occur in many parts of India, nowhere did it inflate to become the spectacular hegemonic process that it did in Lanka.

The aforesaid ideological roots and ethno-class processes, magnified by pogroms, riots and military brutality, aggravated by the armed militant Tamil youth groups emerging in reaction, complicated by Indian intervention in different phases (arming and training Tamil militants in the 1970s and 1980s, providing military intelligence and arms to the Lankan state at present), and convoluted by constitutional impasses and economic shifts (especially the post-1977 neo-liberal policies), have mediated a certain process and outcome. To borrow an Althusserian term, society and politics in Lanka, that is the social whole, is now overdetermined by the ethnic instance.

Thamil Eelam

The responses of Tamil politics have reinforced this overdetermination. The annulment of the citizenship of Tamil plantation workers and the Sinhala Only Act constitute the root of the ethnic imbroglio. From about 1972 passive Tamil resistance, protest marches and sit-ins were broken up by brutal police countermeasures and Tamil youth were horrified to see respectable and staid old gentlemen, their uncles and elders, beaten and degraded on the streets. These experiences were the first events that hardened attitudes and laid the foundations of militant youth politics; but it was the 1983 race riots (Black July) which is the watershed transforming a half-hearted Thamil Eelam cry into a slogan with substantial support.

In the absence of free and fair elections in the Tamil areas for many years, and without a democratic referendum explicitly asking the question, it is impossible to say with any certainty, whether at that time, or any other time, or at the present time, a majority of Tamils desire secession and the establishing of a separate Tamil state. But this is beside the point; does Thamil Eelam have any chance in pluperfect heaven of ever coming to pass? My answer is a resounding ldquo;nordquo; and not for indigenous but for international reasons. Kosovo is irrelevant, America and Europe wanted it, and wanted to tear Yugoslavia to shreds; India does not and likely will never want a separate Tamil state in northern Lanka, so QED. When the LTTE sent Rajiv Gandhi to his funeral pyre it placed another corpse beside him; Thamil Eelam forever died in the blast that dispatched Rajiv. 

There are reasons other than the absence of international support why Thamil Eelam is a non-starter (and it is amazing that an outfit of the LTTErsquo;s ability and sophistication does not have one other country as an ally because of its own international diplomatic incompetence). The ethnic cleansing of Muslims from the Northern Province in 1991 is a galling act of Tamil chauvinism. Just as Israel, after its creation, is embroiled in the appalling fate of Palestinian refugees, so Thamil Eelam, even prior to its birth, faces the conundrum of the Muslims that the LTTE drove out of their homes, businesses and lands; a challenge the LTTE has proved incapable of redressing for 17 years.

The reader may be wondering what the purpose of this rather lengthy introduction in two sections is. It was unavoidable because the point I am attempting to drive home is not a familiar one; the travellers on the road to Damascus are still few and far between. There is no way out for Lanka within its own borders and parameters, thatrsquo;s what I am trying to establish. The Sinhala-Buddhist unitary state of Sri Lanka is at a dead end, Thamil Eelam is a hopeless dream. If you are with me up to here, then we are making progress. When I say Lanka cannot solve its national question within its own parameters, I do, of course, factor-in the familiar types of international involvement, interaction, pressure and mediation as ordinary parameters.

Abolishing mental barriers

If Lankarsquo;s economy is to go anywhere, it must abolish its fences; we have missed the homemade bus, so we need to catch another bus; but more on this anon. It is not only our physical barriers but also our mental limitations that we need to overcome. We will make no progress if we continue to play ball in our own backyard; we need to go out and play ball in a much bigger playing field were we will forget the parochial pettiness of our ethnic teacup. Moving into a larger common market, interacting within a much larger and more diverse culture and the gestalt shift that becoming, albeit gradually, a part of a subcontinent will engender, this is the cathartic experience that will purge the Lankan psyche of its blinkers. There is no other sword with which to cut the Gordian knot. Lanka does not have an influential intellectual class, or a left political leadership, or progressive mass movements, proportionately comparable with India.

The most promising precedent is the successful integration of South India into the Indian national economy and hence the national psyche. The Thamilnadu of Periyaar and Annathurai, communist Kerala, Karnataka the home of IT famed Bangalore, and Andhra Pradesh, have all overcome an obsession with Dravidian schism to become front runners in the Indian market and beneficiaries of Indian intervention in the world market. Maharashtra, Gujerat and West Bengal too are players in the Indian market and its international extensions. The material basis for the physical unity of the Indian Republic, whatever the eventual fate of Kashmir, has been firmly laid and Marx would chuckle with some satisfaction at this validation of his thesis of historical materialism, albeit on a capitalist basis.

Our epiphany wonrsquo;t happen overnight, the backward-looking nationalists who hegemonise Lankarsquo;s ideology and sway its social classes - especially significant sections of the petty bourgeois and plebeian mass - is profoundly antithetical to this thinking. Therefore a start will have to be made in the economic domain, without narrow nationalism comprehending what is really afoot in the ethnic domain.

Abolishing physical barriers

The eventual objective will have to be integration into a sub-continental market and economy and a start has to be made by developing a closer alliance with the Indian capitalist market. I have not shrunk from saying integration instead of pussyfooting with euphemisms like ‘participationrsquo; and lsquo;, and I frankly concede, that for the time being, involvement will have to accept the reality of capitalist domination. I have no particular model of long-term alignment to canvass; economic treaties, common market, confederation or eventual union, history will look after that. There will be investment, but this should mean neither a wholesale takeover by Indian investment, nor the predatory extraction of natural resources because a more mutually beneficial transition is possible. The early attractions should include employment in the IT sector for our youth, better education, good universities and modern technology. For a start we can relearn English, which thanks to our ultras we have all but forgotten; forgive the exaggeration but the havoc wrecked by the ultra nationalists makes for some irritation. And of course Lanka needs infrastructure development (railways, airlines, electricity, telecommunications and roads) and Indian capital has a role to play. Lankarsquo;s motto should be ldquo;If Tamil Nadu could do it and reap such gains, heck we can do it betterrdquo;. Sure there is room for other international players; international players are deeply engaged within India already, arenrsquo;t they? But Lanka needs to make India a special policy focus, a focus on growing an alignment with Indian markets, investment and technology within a reasonable period of time.

There is a fundamental difference between the stage of capitalist development at which India and Lanka are at this time. Indian capitalism has achieved what Walt Rostow called ‘the take of stagersquo;, that is structural change that can support sustained development (obviously on a capitalist basis). The definition he proposed was: ldquo;The old blocks and resistances to steady growth are overcome; the forces making for economic progress expand and come to dominate society; self-sustained growth becomes its normal conditionrdquo;. A report prepared by four economists from an American investment bank (India: Everything to Play for: John Lewellyn, Robert Subbaraman, Alastair Newton and Sonal Varma; Lehman Brothers, October 2007) summarise these structural changes as; high levels of saving and investment, the maturity of the manufacturing sector, substantial productivity gains, strong and healthy international trade, enhanced education and English language skills, deepening of capital markets and internationalisation of the financial sector.

The point is not merely that Lankan capitalism has failed to achieve these structural advances; no what is fundamental is that we have missed the boat altogether. Global developments have passed us by and it is too late to make a revolutionary leap now. If we want to climb out of the failed state syndrome that we have sunk into, Lanka has no choice but to hitch its wagon to another star.

From the frying pan into the fire?

One does read the newspapers and the Internet and watch TV. The following from the BBC of 26th June comes as no surprise. ldquo;Nearly 7,500 people have died in official custody in India over the past five years, according to a report by a human rights group. The report by Delhi-based Asian Centre for Human Rights says many of these people were tortured in custody. It says the Indian government is in a state of denial about torture. Even when action is taken against officials who are accused of wrongdoing the system tries to cover up any crimes. Nearly all the deaths were the result of torture. But the government routinely attributes deaths in custody to illness, attempted escape, suicide and accidentsrdquo;. The repression of tribal groups is no secret; the number of districts in India that are under emergency rule is cause for dismay; the shootings in West Bengal and the massacre in Gujerat are revolting. I am well aware of the rising crescendo of threats to secularism. It is only too well known that neo-liberalism is widening income gaps and engendering increasing inequity in India and elsewhere.

However, I could not by any stretch arrived at my conclusions without factoring in these concerns. This background, this reality, does not vitiate the conclusion. Someone commented: ldquo;Be careful what you wish for; mother India is still in the embrace of Kalirdquo;, but so is mother Lanka and so are many other places, Asian democracies and one party states alike. My argument for integration is not predicated on some imagined Indian utopia.

Having aid this, nevertheless one must add that there is indeed substantial formal democracy in India; the courts are more independent than Lanka, public opinion a great deal more sophisticated and influential, and the press hugely more free. On balance, neither the curbs on democracy and human rights in India, nor the increasing inequity between the social classes, are to my mind, sufficient disincentive to defeat the case for integration. From frying pan into fire is a false idiom in this instance. Most important for Lanka is that the ethos of pluralism is much stronger in India, and it is spreading beyond the kaleidoscope of languages, religions and cultures, to caste liberation and reordering of caste-based political power in many cow-belt states, notwithstanding the grand larceny of the Mayawathi and Yadev types.

Some curious criticisms of the thesis in this paper come from an unexpected quarter, the politically correct soft left. Some ask, would not the case advanced here be grist to the mill of Indian corporate capitalism. Others fear it could be misunderstood in the context of the onward march of diehard Hindutva politics. These are false objections; my case has been systematically built from Lankan perspectives and imperatives, the aspirations of Indian corporate capitalism and Hindutva politics are marginal to the argument. Concerns voiced for reasons of Indian political correctness are beside the point; one must have the intellectual stamina to follow through the line of thought relating to Lankarsquo;s way out of this conundrum to its inexorable logical conclusion.

The time domain as a concept

The fate and foibles of the Congress Party, or the BJP, the Rajapakse Brotherhood, and other transient entities called national governments, are ephemeral elements in the framework of the temporal conceptualisation that motivates this paper. They come and they go, the characterisation of any particular one does not much change the argument, because time in the conceptualisation of the future of nation states that permeates this thesis is another kind of dimension. Sure, governments are the immediate vehicles that transport the more enduring and bulky entity called society and the nation state from terminus to terminus, but they can only slow down, accelerate or distort the motion from time to time. True the mode of transport at any time also colours that enduring hulk that it bears, but there is also something that goes on, if not forever, at least for the longer duration than a nation state and its ethos survives. In this dimension of historical temporality the integration of Lanka into a greater subcontinental entity will be in fealty to a dynamic so powerful it will be akin to the drive of an elemental force, fortified by materialist advantage and political logic.

Kumar David, an electrical engineering professor has worked in Sri Lanka, USA, Sweden and Zimbabwe and was Dean of Engineering in Hong Kong. He has been with the Samasamaja tradition for over 50 years and is currently an ExCo member of the Democratic Left Front. He has published extensively, profesionally, and on the national question and socio-economics.

• A reponse to ETHNOS OR DEMOS? - QUESTIONING TAMIL NATIONALISM



• On ldquo;traitorsrdquo; and federalism: Beyond the hypocrisy, towards collaboration



• For a Sri Lankan Nationalism



• Buying Onions From India amp; China



• Federalism or Nationalism? Fears and Promises

The poll has had the effect of strengthening both pro and anti-devolution camps in their chosen opinions.

I suggest that a realist reading should result in a more nuanced approach to devolution, which escapes the trap of overreaction in either direction, namely allergic rejection and imitative appeasement. With or without the new data from Tamil Nadu, the debate on devolution in Sri Lanka reveals roughly seven and possibly eight points of view or ldquo;linesrdquo;. These are:

1. Zero or small unit devolution: Abolition of the 13^th amendment and Provincial Councils, replacement with District level devolution, if at all.


2. 13^th amendment Minus or Provincial Councils Lite: Retention of Provincial Councils, but deduction or non-implementation of even those powers granted by the 13th amendment.


3. 13^th amendment Classic: The full and speediest possible implementation of the existing 13th amendment, meaning the full devolution of those powers already granted by the 13th amendment.  


4. 13^th amendment Plus: the enhancement of the powers of the 13^th amendment by relocating or partially redistributing the powers of the Concurrent list. This position subdivides between those who are willing to risk a constitutional amendment and those who seek only that which is possible without one.


5. The Indian model: quasi-federalism; powers no less than those of an Indian state.


6. Full or classic federalism.


7. ISGA/Confederation of two states.


8. No ethnic based federalism or two unit model; a radical reform of the state, citizenship and identity, reflecting hybridity, secularism and pluralism. 

Positions 1-7 are present to varying degrees in the political domain, national and international (including the twin Diasporas) while the last arises from within the civil society intelligentsia (Prof Nira Wickremesingha in Open Democracy). 

While administrative decentralisation is needed for purposes of development, devolution or transfer of some measure of power from centre to second order units at the periphery, is needed as a bridge between the North and South, the Tamils and the Sinhalese.

Therefore any and all devolution proposals must pass the test of enjoying the support of some segment of both communities. It must at the least, be at the interface of the two ldquo;setsrdquo;, namely Sinhala and Tamil opinion.

No sustainable solution can be unilaterally imposed upon either the Sinhalese or the Tamils.  

Positions 1 amp; 2 (abolish or weaken Provincial Councils) have no takers outside the Sinhala community, and therefore fails the test of acceptability by at least some Tamils.

The international and regional blowback of any such move (which would have many powerful opponents and no supporters whatsoever outside the island), would be disastrous for our military efforts and our overall stability and security. 

Similarly, Positions 6 and 7 (federalism, con-federalism) have no takers among the Sinhalese, going by public opinion polls, the results of which, ranging from the 1997 polling by Research International Pvt Ltd, up to todayrsquo;s CPA polls, have been remarkably consistent.

Position 5 that of Indian model quasi federalism, enjoys, according to the CPA (and much to its regret) 5% support among the majority Sinhala community- thatrsquo;s 5% of 74%. No mainstream political party or candidate in a competitive electoral democracy (and that includes Senator Obama) would treat as anything other than radioactive, a position that was so hopelessly unpopular. And yet, otherwise sensible Tamil politicians expect the two main Southern parties to agree on this. If there were any such possibility, President Kumaratungarsquo;s 1995and 1997 ldquo;union of regionsrdquo; packages, or her admirable August 2000 draft Constitution would have obtained bipartisan support, instead of suffering the highly visible fates they did.

The new argument, basing itself on the Ananda Vikatan opinion poll, is that Sri Lanka can best protect itself from pro-Tamil Eelam sentiment by adopting the Indian model of quasi-federalism.

This argument runs up against several counter-considerations.

Firstly, by the same logic, Cuba can best protect itself from the extreme anti-Cuban Revolution sentiments of Florida-and by extension Washington DC, since Florida has a significant influence on American electionsndash; by adopting an economic and political model such as that which prevails in the USA. Any self -respecting Cuban, and there is an island full of them, would reject that argument with the contempt it deserves. 

Secondly, by what logic do 50 million ethnic Tamils in Tamil Nadu and a tiny fraction of that number in Sri Lanka require the same quantum and therefore model of devolution?

Thirdly, by what measure is the opinion of the citizens of Tamil Nadu of greater validity with regard to the internal arrangements of Sri Lanka, than those of over 95 % of Sinhalese citizens of this country, comprising 74% of the population, who oppose Indian model quasi-federalism?

Fourthly, this pro-Tamil separatist opinion in Tamil Nadu is a news flash? It would not have been so to generations of Sinhalese going back millennia, into antiquity. The anti-Sri Lankan and anti-Sinhala sentiment in Tamil Nadu represents an existential threat of long historical duration, which we must permanently protect ourselves against.

The new polling data must neither be ignored and brushed aside as irrelevant, nor appeased by mimicry of models.   

Many Tamil politicians and liberal commentators forget Sri Lankarsquo;s bitter experience with the Vardharajaperumal administration (from which I had resigned a year before, alarmed at the trends behind the scene), which made an Unilateral Declaration of Independence but could not be instantly dissolved by the Government without first bringing amending legislation which made that possible. 

What is needed by way of response is neither a model that is so tightly closed and claustrophobic that it generates irredentist sentiment, nor one that is so carelessly open that it permits irredentism.

This brings us to positions 3, 4 and 8. The last is probably the most attractive but seems unrealistic at the moment. The lamentable fate of the Equal Rights Bill presented by President Kumaratunga in 2000, withdrawn in the face of agitation by alumni of certain leading (boys and girls) schools in Colombo and the JVP run Inter University Students and Bhikku Federations, shows how far we are from that level of enlightened consciousness. As Mr Anandasangaree correctly reminds us, the easy abolition of Section 29, the anti-discrimination clause of the Soulbury Constitution, gives the minorities no reason to trust a solution devoid of political space and some measure of self governance.

That leaves Positions 3 and 4: 13th amendment Classic and 13th amendment Plus.

Position 3 and possibly 4 are the only ones with significant support from the Sinhala public and some support from some Tamils (both North and East). Thus 13th amendment Classic passes the test. (Arguably, so does 4, but this is a stretch).

Most recently at the SAARC summit, President Rajapakse has rightly re-iterated his governmentrsquo;s commitment to Position 3, ldquo;the comprehensive implementation of the 13th amendmentldquo;, drawing attention to the Eastern process with its elected Chief Minister and expressing his belief that the Northern Province will similarly possess a Chief Minister. Given that the Sri Lankan armed forces have gained the strategic initiative and are on the strategic offensive, this is a prospect for the foreseeable future. In his remarks the President also left room for submissions by the APRC.

Recent retrospectives surrounding the Karadzic trial regarding the events in former Yugoslavia recall the disaster of the holding of a referendum in Bosnia in 1992, with the Serbs abstaining and the Bosnian Muslims voting in favour. This was the schism that resulted in civil war. Bosnia shows the absolute imperative on avoiding a referendum in an ethnically or ethno-religiously polarised society, and therefore the imperative of avoiding any proposals that require a referendum.

This is why the only man with a roadmap, Douglas Devananda, has embraced President Rajapaksersquo;s ldquo;comprehensive implementation of the 13th amendmentrdquo; as the  only feasible start, while placing the 13th amendment Plus, and even consideration of the Indian model, as subsequent stages of political evolution. Between the various stages of his gradualist formula lie periods of the broadening of consensus and the building up of trust between the communities over time and through practical experience.

• Federalism: Some debates never die



• On ldquo;traitorsrdquo; and federalism: Beyond the hypocrisy, towards collaboration



• On the UNPrsquo;s ldquo;Repositioningrdquo;



• A military pathway to nation building



• Responding to Sumanasri Liyanage: On Mahinda bowing down to the ‘differing majority’ and On changing the terminology from ‘federal’ to ‘power sharing’

Once I blamed a Tamil friend of mine who is a leading professional, for not taking an active part in the search for a solution to the ethnic impasse. He was despondent and thought it a waste of time to get involved with a problem that no government after independence has had the guts to get to grips with. According to him, all of